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Counter-Conduct and the Everyday: Anthropological
Engagements with Philosophy
OLGA DEMETRIOU
This article critically examines counter-conduct as an analytical tool for understanding
minority subjectivity. It revisits the concept within itsCollège lecture context and along-
side alternative descriptions of opposing governmental power. Its afﬁnities with the
anthropological notion of the “everyday” are explored in depth. The anthropological
everyday, it is argued, points to nuances that enrich our understanding of the political.
Heidegger’s notions of “everyday” and “they” are discussed alongside ethnographic
insights from Greece and Cyprus. This anthropological-philosophical encounter yields
a more meaningful understanding of counter-conduct, as embedded in the everyday,
that addresses both its broad scope and its analytic speciﬁcity.
Introduction
The key feature of counter-conduct is undoubtedly its breadth: it may, at ﬁrst
glance, be deﬁned as any kind of resistance. As such, it politicises the everyday
and locates politics “everywhere”. It supplements earlier conceptualisations of
power by making explicit what these everyday politics of resistance imply. In
this article I want to explore this notion of the “everyday” as the hinge on which
politicisation hangs. If counter-conduct is “any” kind of resistance, the question
that the concept of the everyday answers is how it operates. Counter-conduct, Fou-
cault is at pains to show, involves an understanding of how one is conducted and
how this conduct could be otherwise. It has, in short, a reﬂective quality that also
lends it a theoretical nuance beyond the “anything” of resistance. The anthropolo-
gical everyday is exactly about this reﬂection. Yet Foucault’s account does not
provide the conditions for reﬂection on everyday practice. By addressing this
absence here I am proposing possibilities for how counter-conduct can operate con-
ceptually. I then show that this operation is particularly instructive for the under-
standing of minority subjectivity.
In the following sections, I ﬁrst consider the discursive context of the lectures
within which counter-conduct emerges as a pivotal moment in Foucauldian think-
ing. I then elaborate on the meanings that emerge out of this context and their link
to the politics of the everyday in anthropological theory and philosophy. Minority
subjectivity is a particular case in point, where the politics of the everyday is
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inevitably counter-conductive. By this I mean that minority subjectivity entails, in
contrast to majority subjectivity, the constant reﬂection, rethinking and negotiation
of the power that underlies everyday encounters. In that sense, counter-conduct is
inevitable in the minority everyday, more than in other cases. Revisiting my own
data from Greece and Cyprus, I locate the reﬂective counter-conductive
moments which tie inextricably together the political and the everyday. My key
objective is to introduce the philosophical-anthropological notion of the “every-
day” into the discussion of counter-conduct and in doing so to exemplify how
reﬂection operates as a condition of counter-conductive practice.
Locating the Everyday in Counter-Conduct
As one of the major concepts developed in Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de
France, counter-conduct appears surprisingly brieﬂy in both primary and second-
ary Foucauldian literature. This is all the more surprising because counter-
conduct is intrinsically connected to other concepts emerging in his major
books, like discourse, power and subjectivation. It is equally connected to con-
cepts like governmentality and biopolitics that have emerged more recently
through the wide availability of English translations of the Collège lectures
(which may be considered a “second wave” of Foucauldian readings, preﬁgured
by earlier selections).1 It is telling that the series editor of the lectures translations
singled out counter-conduct as a formative concept in Foucault’s later works.2
While perhaps not always explicitly stated, counter-conduct emerges in these
studies as constitutive of governmentality in the everyday, not at its limits
(even though also there). As with the prison, the hospital and the quarantined
neighbourhood,3 it is not the exceptionality of protest that is most instructive
(e.g. as something that disrupts political order), but the ways in which it consti-
tutes such order. And if the centrality of the prison, the hospital and the quaran-
tine is calibrated on the basis of inventory, demographics and categorisation, the
passage of counter-conduct to the central stage of the political is via the everyday
(as is the case in the previous examples, but perhaps even more so, if only because
of its unmediated political character).
Counter-conduct, it may be argued then, sits at the very foundation of political
subjectivity—the crux of the entire Foucauldian oeuvre. But it is the more politically
invested side of this subjectivity, and it therefore requires a much more dynamic
grounding than previous accounts may have suggested. If subjectivity emerges
out of conditions of being, counter-conduct stresses that these conditions are far
1. Carl Death, “Counter-Conducts: A Foucauldian Analytics of Protest ”, Social Movement Studies,
Vol. 9, No. 3 (2010), pp. 235–251; Louisa Cadman, “How (Not) To Be Governed: Foucault, Critique,
and the Political”, Environment and Planning. D, Society and Space, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2010), pp. 539–556;
Arnold Davidson, “In Praise of Counter-Conduct”, History of the Human Sciences, Vol. 24, No. 4
(2011), pp. 25–41; Louiza Odysseos, “Governing Dissent in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve: ‘Devel-
opment’, Governmentality, and Subjectiﬁcation amongst Botswana’s Bushmen”, Globalizations, Vol. 8,
No. 4 (2011), pp. 439–455; Marit Rosol, “On Resistance in the Post-Political City: Conduct and
Counter-Conduct in Vancouver”, Space and Polity, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2014), pp. 70–84.
2. Davidson, op. cit.
3. References are to well-known examples from, respectively, Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish
(New York: Vintage, 1977), Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: Random House,
1978–1986) and Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic (New York: Vintage, 1975).
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from inert. The “just being” of any such condition is stripped away so that conduct
and counter-conduct are always in process and always under question. This
dynamic is a political dynamic. One way to thus read the theoretical intervention
achieved by counter-conduct is in the politically dynamic shift from “just” being.
This shift is what much of anthropology has theorised under the sign of “the every-
day”. The everyday, as political and as in process, is (the locus of) counter-conduct.
Much like the Panopticon was meant to be read not as an exceptional and localised
device but one that arises and is diffused in the logic of government (and shows
something speciﬁc about it), counter-conduct is a speciﬁc subjective orientation
that arises everywhere. This reading of the everyday helps clarify the difference
between speciﬁcity in orientation and generality in location. Such clarity is argu-
ably missing from Foucault’s own account where counter-conduct is exempliﬁed
on the one hand through limit-cases (e.g. military desertion) and is on the other
hand insisted upon as a term that goes beyond speciﬁc practices (e.g. dissidence).
The 1 March 1978 lecture, where counter-conduct is examined, prompts us to
think of the “everyday” as a methodologically nuanced analytical tool. As an
anthropologist, I am concerned to explore these nuances both within the discipline
(where the everyday is a principal concept) and in regard to its reception in philos-
ophy. Between the two disciplines, the term “everyday” has been exchanged on
numerous occasions, and for different purposes; these exchanges could collectively
be seen as a debate about the banality and sublimation of human practice in the
twentieth century (where the state ﬁgures as a primary agent). In what follows I
take a critical view of part of this exchange, which allows an understanding of
the everyday as a means for grasping the political dynamics inherent in counter-
conduct. I therefore read, in later sections, Veena Das’s anthropological take on
the “everyday” against Heidegger’s notion of it and Nancy’s critique of the latter.
Relating my own work to these philosophical anthropologies, I thus argue that
the everyday, as a means of understanding the political in counter-conduct, is
one plane on which a more nuanced understanding of minority subjectivity may
take shape.
What I mean by “everyday” here partakes of the “social” but is not limited to it in
the way that it is often used as a matter of course. It is a particular mode of being
that although related to, cannot be equated to concepts like “normal”, “average”,
“typical”, “unreﬂecting” and so on, which are all too often assumed in the concep-
tualisation of the social. At the same time, it is a mode of being, existing “by
default” but yet not attached to some primordial universal essence. In the course
of the article, I want to explain this “everyday” as an anthropological concept
that philosophy has contextualised often problematically in the social-
universal continuum. This makes it relevant to Foucauldian and philosophical ana-
lytics because it has the potential to re-situate our understanding of the political.
A Badly Constructed Word
I want to start with counter-conduct as a cognate concept to resistance, dissent or
protest. These are not lexical alternatives to counter-conduct; they indicate its
meaning by their difference to it. Foucault is unambiguous on that point. He intro-
duces the word “counter-conduct” in the same lecture as “conduct” and with a
disclaimer:
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what I will propose to you is the doubtless badly constructed word
“counter-conduct”—the latter having the sole advantage of allowing refer-
ence to the active sense of the word “conduct”—counter-conduct in the
sense of struggle against the processes implemented for conducting
others.4
From the outset, this explanation lays bare the problematics of activity/passivity
embedded in any theory of action, and particularly in Foucauldian understandings
of power. In exploring the formal elements of counter-conduct, Foucault devotes
the latter half of his lecture to the emergence of counter-conduct within the Chris-
tian pastorate. Asceticism is presented there as “the ﬁrst element of anti-pastoral or
pastoral counter-conduct” because it pushes past the limits of Christian structures
of power.5 It should be noted that the discussion develops on the premise that
“[c]onﬂicts of conduct will occur on the border and edge of the political insti-
tution”.6 The political import of this view inheres in asceticism’s active component,
which pastoral obedience rejects: “in obedience there is never anything of this joust
with others or with oneself”.7 Recalling a preceding passing remark to Buddhist
asceticism, one might relate the transformation of such counter-conduct in moder-
nity to Gandhi’s satyagraha—occupying a position outside violence and outside
passivity, embedded in the idea of force (often interpreted under the sign of
“truth-” or “soul-force”). Satyagraha in fact might be seen as a bridge point
between asceticism and the next element of pastoral counter-conduct Foucault
examines: communities. These are communities formed on the basis of rejecting
speciﬁc forms of authority. In these communities, the primacy of “being conducted
otherwise” gains political force—the joust has a social aspect. But this social aspect
is always tempered by the critique of authority (Gandhi’s Tolstoy farm is brought to
mind as a modern alternative to Foucault’s examples).8 This critique of particular
incarnations of authority (in the pastor) is a feature of another element he examines,
mysticism. Mysticism is counter-conducting because it dispenses with the
mediation of the pastor between God and self – and this dispensation exists also
in the immediacy of the text and the imminent arrival of the Holy Spirit, elements
with which Foucault ends his examples.
What counter-conduct offers, he concludes, is a way of revisiting the relations
between active and passive positioning vis-à-vis power:
Rather than say that each class, group, or social force has its ideology that
allows it to translate its aspirations into theory, aspirations and ideology
from which corresponding institutional reorganizations are deduced, we
should say: every transformation that modiﬁes the relations of force
between communities or groups, every conﬂict that confronts them or
4. Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978. Vol. 4
(New York: Macmillan, 2009), p. 201, emphasis added.
5. Ibid., p. 208.
6. Ibid., p. 198.
7. Ibid., p. 207.
8. Steger provides a compelling comparison between Foucauldian power and Gandhian resistance,
which gives pause for rethinking Foucauldian conceptions of violence, even if underplaying the preoc-
cupations of Foucault with analysis and Gandhi with a political project: Manfred B. Steger, “Searching
for Satya through Ahimsa: Gandhi’s Challenge to Western Discourses of Power”, Constellations, Vol. 13,
No. 3 (2006), pp. 332–353.
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brings them into competition calls for the utilization of tactics which allows
the modiﬁcation of relations of power and the bringing into play of theor-
etical elements which morally justify and give a basis to these tactics in
rationality.9
The difference is between an inert and an active understanding of the process of
positioning. Rather than speak about ideology that allows change to be explained,
counter-conduct speaks of tactics that are used to modify relations. It propels a con-
ceptual movement from ideology to practice, where “practice” takes form in the
operationalisation of tactics. Indicative of this emphasis on action is also the fact
that after the formulation of “counter-conduct” Foucault rejects the alternative
term misconduct on the basis that it “only refers to the passive sense of the
word, of behaviour: not conducting oneself properly”.10 It is in this sense the imbri-
cation of concept and practice that distinguishes counter-conduct as a speciﬁc form
of resistance. And it is this that renders it a constant, everyday event. It is also what
renders it necessary for the perpetuation of power across the planes of law, religion
and modern sovereignty. This necessity is carried over from the pastorate to the
modern state.
And it is this movement that points to another key characteristic of counter-
conduct: its speciﬁc orientation towards the political. Foucault articulates this in
his rejection of the term dissidence. Exemplifying dissidence through reference to
the Soviet Union and Solzhenitsyn, he says that dissidence “designate[s] a
complex form of resistance and refusal, which involves a political refusal… in a
society where political authority… [conducts] individuals in their daily life
through a game of generalized obedience that takes the form of terror…
[whereby] those who command tremble with fear themselves”.11 “[T]he word dis-
sidence is too localized today in this kind of phenomena”, he concludes, “so let’s
give up this word”.12 As a “badly constructed word”, counter-conduct speaks to an
inability of description for actions, behaviours, discourses, dispositions, that sit at
the cusp of the political, uncertainly belonging to politics proper, yet thoroughly
invested in power and its perpetuation—thus thoroughly political. This is what I
further read in the long explanation for rejecting “dissidence” as a more eloquent
substitute—there is just something too political about “dissidence”.
This rejection of dissidence hits upon the limitations that others have seen in Fou-
cault’s political philosophy.13 Jacqueline Stevens, for example, has taken issue with
9. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, op. cit., p. 216ff.
10. Ibid., p. 201.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Foucault’s weariness of contemporary political commentary has been noted by a number of people
to different extents, including Michael Welch, “Pastoral Power as Penal Resistance: Foucault and the
Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons”, Punishment & Society, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2010), pp. 47–63; Alain Beau-
lieu, “Towards a Liberal Utopia: The Connection between Foucault’s Reporting on the Iranian Revolu-
tion and the Ethical Turn”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 36, No. 7 (2010), pp. 801–818; Kim Su
Rassmussen, “Foucault’s Genealogy of Racism”, Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 28, No. 5 (2011),
pp. 34–51; Jessica Whyte, “Is Revolution Desirable? Michel Foucault on Revolution, Neoliberalism
and Rights”, in Ben Golder (ed.), Re-reading Foucault: On Law, Power and Rights (Abingdon: Routledge,
2013), pp. 207–228. I am not here concerned with particular political stances or failure to take them,
but rather with how we may today employ counter-conduct to inform our own. This is why I ﬁnd
Stevens’methodological critique valuable.
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the silence about the world wars in Foucault’s writings and interprets it as a meth-
odological problem:
the nation-state’s ability throughout history to establish itself as sacred and
not simply a welfare consortium is one of juridical power’s continuities and
not an epistemic break onwhich Foucault strategically, I believe, insists. On
what other basis could his writings almost entirely marginalize the most
important traumas of the twentieth century, namely World War I and
World War II?14
Indeed, not only on this instance (of the world wars) but elsewhere too, Foucault
stops short of following through the repercussions of his critical analysis of
power for contemporary political conﬁgurations, events and issues. A penetrating
critique of race and colonialism is an absence noted by others.15 More recently, ana-
lysts have looked to his lectures for hints as to how that gap would have been
ﬁlled.16 They have also documented an engagement with humanitarian politics
in speeches and political writings.17 Belying this misconstrued dis-engagement,
the notion of counter-conduct provides a basis for a critical assessment of the pro-
liferation of contemporary state power. I would argue that the continuities of juri-
dical power from the sacred to the liberalism of welfare are traceable in counter-
conduct, in as far as counter-conduct marks the limit at which law and its function
is reﬂected upon and questioned rather than being followed as habit. In relating to
the political as a positioning vis-à-vis authority and its rule-making powers, but
without ascription of the speciﬁc formulations of dissidence (or resistance, or
revolt, or protest) to this positioning, counter-conduct communicates the continu-
ities of juridical power that Stevens correctly faults previous writings for missing.
Counter-conduct is thus present along the spectrum of subjectivity, as a speciﬁc
relation to authority that marks religious as well as state politics. It moulds subjec-
tivities—majority, minority and even radical, as I show in ﬁnal sections—yet
without determining particular forms of action. The “everywhere” of counter-
conduct is temporal in a diachronic “everyday”, not only a contemporary one.
The rejection of dissidence could in this sense also be due to its localisation in
the Cold War Soviet Union. And thus perhaps it could be that localisation in the
extremes of world wars that Foucault might have wanted to avoid in theorising
conduct and counter-conduct as aspects of welfare democracies. The speciﬁc qual-
ities of this anthropological everyday that I want to recover here point to a way for
thinking the continuity of the everyday across planes of power yet without attach-
ing it to a primordial essence, as a philosophical take might suggest.
14. Jacqueline Stevens, States without Nations: Citizenship for Mortals (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2011), p. 43.
15. Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial
Order of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); Robert Young, “Foucault on Race and Colo-
nialism”, New Formations, Vol. 25 (1995), pp. 57–65.
16. See David Macey, “Rethinking Biopolitics, Race and Power in the Wake of Foucault”, Theory,
Culture & Society, Vol. 26, No. 6 (2009), pp. 186–205; Chloë Taylor, “Race and Racism in Foucault’s
Collège de France Lectures”, Philosophy Compass, Vol. 6, No. 11 (2011), pp. 746–756; Rassmussen, op. cit.
17. JessicaWhyte, “Human Rights: Confronting Governments?Michel Foucault and the Right to Inter-
vene”, in Matthew Stone, Illan rua Wall and Costas Douzinas (eds.), New Critical Legal Thinking: Law and
the Political (London: Taylor & Francis, 2012), pp. 11–31.
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Foucault’s concern to cover something very speciﬁc through counter-conduct
yet all the while maintaining its generality is echoed in each one of the terms he
rejects in favour of this “badly constructed” alternative. Disobedience is rejected
as “too weak no doubt”18 and fails to articulate the strength of Anabaptism, an
example of pastoral counter-conduct he returns to frequently. Revolt, on the
other hand, “is both too precise and too strong to designate much more diffuse
and subdued forms of resistance”.19 Insubordination “is a word that in a way is
localized and attached to military insubordination”,20 even though it is an impor-
tant example of counter-conduct. The consideration of insubordination in fact
yields a historically honed-in perspective on counter-conduct: “a phenomenon of
resistance of conduct appears here [in military insubordination] that no longer
has the old form of desertion… a moral counter-conduct”.21
By comparison to these, resistance is perhaps the most interesting alternative,
one that is not manifestly rejected, but which remains a point of reference through-
out. It is worth pausing here to consider it as a term against which the generality
and speciﬁcity of counter-conduct is elaborated. Resistance is the ﬁrst term men-
tioned in the discussion of counter-conduct, where Foucault lays out his intention:
“I would like to try to identify some of the points of resistance, some of the forms of
attack and counter-attack that appeared within the ﬁeld of the pastorate”.22 Elabor-
ating, he speaks of “movements of resistance and insubordination [that] appeared
in correlation with [pastorate conduct] that could be called speciﬁc revolts of
conduct…whose objective is a different form of conduct”.23 In regard to these
movements, what is at stake is “whether the speciﬁcity of refusal, revolts, and
forms of resistance of conduct corresponded to the historical singularity of the pas-
torate”.24 This is an important question in the analysis of state power because it
introduces the break between sacredness and welfare that Stevens identiﬁes:
Just as there have been forms of resistance to power as the exercise of political
sovereignty, and just as there have been other, equally intentional forms of
resistance or refusal that were directed at power in the form of economic
exploitation, have there not been forms of resistance to power as
conducting?25
Resistance, it seems, is the broader ﬁeld of action within which counter-conduct
occurs—counter-conduct is a form of resistance. I would like to revise this
reading in light of the debates (post-Foucault of course but nevertheless beneﬁting
our reading of the lectures) about resistance as a “weapon of the weak”.26 James
Scott’s deﬁnition of resistance has been embraced and critiqued, primarily within
anthropology, because it widened the ﬁeld of agency on the one hand, yet afﬁrmed,
18. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, op. cit., p. 200.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 198.
22. Ibid., p. 194, italics in original.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 195, emphasis added.
25. Ibid., emphasis added.
26. James Scott,Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1985).
224 Olga Demetriou
on closer reading, essentialisms about effective and ineffective forms of action
against authority on the other.27 Foucault’s counter-conduct also contains this
implication when he ascribes to it, seven pages after the passage above, the
quality of “someone actually acting”. At the point of rejecting dissidence, he says
that “there is a process of sanctiﬁcation or hero worship” that skews the ﬁeld of
interpretation, not allowing us to include all “the components in the way in
which someone actually acts in the very general ﬁeld of politics or in the very
general ﬁeld of power relations… that may well be found in fact in delinquents,
mad people, and patients”.28 In light of the preceding discussion of action, I
would like to suggest that we read “someone actually acts” as a slip; counter-
conduct is a productive concept precisely because it is not conﬁned to resistance
as an “act”. It can be a thought, a reﬂection, or the lack of reﬂection. It is there in
being in the everyday. The talk of “act” presents it as political, but the inclusion
of the categories “delinquents, mad people, and patients” points to it as non-politi-
cally charged. This is the primary political ﬁeld that counter-conduct negotiates:
power relations but not necessarily political charge.
In this speciﬁc understanding of resistance the problems of interiority/exteriority
and action/passivity take on a different quality. The power of political sovereignty
and the power of economic exploitation are more politically charged and in this
sense they are different from the form of power as conducting (that makes up
the wider ﬁeld of the political). Power as conducting carries no such political
charge. Resistance puts these three forms together, and counter-conduct clariﬁes
their differentiation: it is “resistance to power as conducting” against “resistance
to power” in the two other forms: political sovereignty and economic exploitation.
This politico-economic nexus that stands opposite conduct has been the central axis
of resistance studies pace Scott and it is signiﬁcantly on this basis that its critics have
insisted for a greater attention to the subjectivising aspects of such power. Foucault
seems aware of the tension between an esoteric care of the self and an external poli-
tics of the state. This is why he frames the establishment of the pastorate against
“disorder” as a form of counter-conduct itself—the two cannot but co-exist. It is
also why he marks out counter-conduct vis-à-vis these other forms of protest. Of
particular concern are “[p]olitical revolts against power exercised by a form of
sovereignty… [as well as] economic revolts against power inasmuch as it main-
tains or guarantees exploitation”. Connections, he will submit, exist between
revolts of conduct and political and economic ones. His examples are Luther,
revolts around women’s status, and ﬁnally the English Revolution, where he sees
“a quite special dimension of the resistance of conduct, of conﬂicts around the
problem of conduct”.29
These examples point to an understanding of “counter-conduct” as a matter of
perspective: counter-conduct is not “that which is not Revolution”, “that which is
not political or economic revolt”, but rather, any kind of resistance that involves
27. Examples include Timothy Mitchell, “Everyday Metaphors of Power”, Theory and Society, Vol. 19,
No. 5 (1990), pp. 545–577; Iris Jean-Klein, “Nationalism and Resistance: The Two Faces of Everyday Acti-
vism in Palestine during the Intifada”, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1991), pp. 83–126; Sherry
Ortner, “Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal”, Comparative Studies in Society and
History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1995), pp. 173–193; and Begoña Aretxaga, Shattering Silence: Women, Nationalism,
and Political Subjectivity in Northern Ireland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
28. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, op. cit., p. 202.
29. Ibid., p. 197.
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taking account of how one is conducted and how this could be otherwise. This is ultimately
what allows counter-conduct to transition from the pastorate to the state. It is not the
“what”of action that determines counter-conduct, but the “how”of subjectivation: if
conduct is about moulding a population so that its existence appears “natural” or
“normal”, counter-conduct entails a reﬂection on this work, however implicit or
intentional (applying to dissidents and insubordinates as much as to mad people
and patients). It is simultaneously a work on the self and a work on power. This
quality of counter-conduct exists in the pastorate as it does in modern statehood.
The signiﬁcance of all of this is that it allows us to situate counter-conduct within
the Foucauldian oeuvre as covering the entire power question of the political in the
everyday. For if we are to see the cultural/moral question as an aspect of, and not
“distinct from… political power exercised by a form of sovereignty”,30 then the
conduct/counter-conduct structure is part of the political, including when it is exer-
cised by a form of sovereignty. It establishes the continuity of the political every-
where and against the distinctions from the political power of sovereignty and
economy (i.e. the politics on the side of big Revolutions, Government, or the
Party). That this integration is so often missed, even in studies that strive to
speak against the caricature separation between “macro-” and “micro-”politics,
is cause to reconsider the everyday much more closely.
Anthropological Perspectives on the Everyday
An illustration of the everyday I am talking about is Veena Das’s anthropological
reworking of the philosophy of ethics. This is how she describes the task of render-
ing the everyday a tool for reconceptualising ethics:
I will argue for a shift in perspective from thinking of ethics as made up of
judgments we arrive at when we stand away from our ordinary practices
to that of thinking of the ethical as a dimension of everyday life in which
we are not aspiring to escape the ordinary but rather to descend into it
as a way of becoming moral subjects. Such a descent into the ordinary
does not mean that no attempt is made to work on this ordinary in the
sense of cultivating critical attitudes toward one’s culture as it stands,
and also working to improve one’s conditions of life but that such work
is done not by orienting oneself to transcendental, objectively agreed-
upon values but rather through the cultivation of sensibilities within the
everyday. One way to put this is in terms of the labor of bringing about
an eventual everyday from within the actual everyday.31
Das provides ample examples of how the everyday in its banal form entails moral
judgements: in gestures, offerings and greetings, that may be modiﬁed in subtle
ways to acknowledge difference in status (e.g. wealth) and avoid offence. These
are examples that we may well recognise as “anthropological” and which have
often migrated across disciplines, in many cases under the rubric of Bourdieuian
“habitus”, to show that people around the world internalise rules of behaviour.
30. Ibid., p. 196.
31. Veena Das, “Ordinary Ethics”, in Didier Fassin (ed.), A Companion to Moral Anthropology (Malden:
Wiley Blackwell, 2012), pp. 133–149, at p. 134.
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Yet in Das’s treatment, it is evident that this habit is not inert—it involves constant
cultural reﬂection.
Das locates the insertion of daily moral judgements into situations marred by
extreme violence. The difference between her “eventual everyday” and her
“actual everyday” points to this violence—violence that makes it impossible to
speak of the “everyday” as an “ordinary” condition. Deaths in war (e.g. the par-
tition of India) or in disaster (e.g. Bhopal) are such instances that push the “every-
day” well beyond the sphere of the ordinary, for those affected who have to
continue inhabiting it. On this basis, she argues that the “everyday” needs to be
reconceptualised as a condition that one descends in. She makes this comment
directly against philosophies that take the “everyday” as the signiﬁer of some uni-
versal human quality, elevated on a theoretical level of the sublime and often tied to
the question of God. She thus concludes: “It seems that ‘ordinary ethics’ evident in
such gestures has the potential to generate an eventual everyday from the ruins of
the actual everyday by putting together the rubbles and ruins and learning to live
in that very space of devastation yet once again”.32 The “eventual everyday”, as I
read it, is not the transcendental aspect of the “actual everyday” because transcen-
dence is understood in an upwardmove (sublimation). If it is transcendental, it is so
in the opposite direction: drilling into the muck of violence far beyond (hence trans-
cending) the ordinary from which normality must somehow be inhabited.
I ﬁnd this notion of “descent” into the everyday extremely useful for engaging a
discussion of counter-conduct and its manifestations. I will brieﬂy consider one
aspect of this descent here—the “cultivati[on of] critical attitudes toward one’s
culture”,33 which has been a point of focus in my own ethnographic work. I
want to rethink some ethnographic episodes, which I have extensively presented
elsewhere, through attention to the philosophical elaboration on the everyday
found in Heidegger, which Das also gestures to, as well as to Nancy’s critique
of this Heideggerian everyday, which I will argue exhibits remarkable and
subtle anthropological insights that can be invaluable to a cross-disciplinary dis-
cussion. I want to suggest that if the “ordinary” is substituted with “majority”
then we may be closer to conceptualising myriads of “actual everydays” whose
violence need not be unspeakable, but still entails a descent through being
normalised.
One illuminating ethnographic moment in western Thrace, Greece, was the scene
of a ceremonious visit by middle-aged women to the mother of a nine-year-old boy
who had just had his circumcision operation. Western Thrace is an area of Greece
inhabited by a number of ethnic groups, most notable amongst whom are “the
Muslim minority” (as the legal appellation goes) who, in large numbers and
against state rhetoric, self-identify as Turks.34 The boy at this stage was being edu-
cated in a Greek elementary school, his mother having opted out of education in a
minority school, because of the poor standards of these schools. The women
engaged in small talk with the boy and his mother, and some of their questions
were judged as intrusive and/or offensive according to the “everyday moral judge-
ment” they articulated in telling me the story later. The mother at some point
retreated to the kitchen to prepare another dessert platter and the boy grabbed
32. Ibid., p. 145.
33. Ibid., p. 134.
34. Olga Demetriou, Capricious Borders: Minority, Population and Counter-Conduct between Greece and
Turkey (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013), pp. 181–190.
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the opportunity of her absence to sing the Greek national anthem, apparently
without any provocation, “out of the blue”, she said.
When the incident was related to me by the hosts, they both laughed, the mother
described feelings of embarrassment and the boy grinned mischievously. My ques-
tion “why?” was answered by a nonchalant “I was just bored!” The national
anthem was sung at the women, I was to understand, and indeed, I was told
that they left soon after. My further understanding here is that this kind of offensive
singing entailed a reﬂection, on the part of Sinan, the nine-year-old, on the political
values of the minority community, which included a disdain for Greek national
symbols and a fear that the Greek state was trying to assimilate the minority
(schooling being one strategy). This was of course not a deep and tortured reﬂec-
tion of the kind philosophy engages in (and which other minority individuals
shared with me at other points) but a reﬂection integrated into Sinan’s routines
of life to such an extent that it could elicit an act of mockery directed at elderly
women, as well as to the minority community at large and the Greek state, all at
once. This, to me, is an example of counter-conduct borne of reﬂection on the
self, the ways in which the self is conducted, and the ways in which the self can
be conducted otherwise, and in the process also perhaps conduct others otherwise.
Counter-conduct is not just in the “act”, but perhaps more so in the reﬂection; but
equally importantly, this reﬂection is un-sublimated, almost unacknowledged in a
moment of “simple” boredom.
The explanation of boredom relates “thick description”,35 in the sense of an
opening up of multiple analytic alternatives, at the same time as it evacuates it.
It proposes that things could be otherwise: the ideology of nationalism could
index something other than the subjection of the minority, and the minority
could internalise an affect other than victimisation in relation to it. In this “other-
wise” the singing of the anthem would not take place, and if it did, it would not
be adversarial. This reﬂection is part and parcel of the act. But it is also denied,
insistently un-sublimated, downgraded to “boredom”. The import of this expla-
nation of boredom cannot really be grasped (or accepted) unless we dwell on a
particular aspect of the everyday in Thrace: the operation of the “they” as refer-
ence to people of the minority community that exemplify a proper way of
being. This “they”, I have argued elsewhere, operates in Thrace as a way of
acknowledging at the same time both the self’s distinction from the idea of a “min-
ority community” and its unquestionable immersion in it. It points to another
layer of the jousting of counter-conduct where esoteric and social aspects (as in
asceticism and communities, say) clash. The import of this complexity calls for
a return to Heidegger and his foundational treatments of the “everyday” and
the “they”, which inspired much of humanistic anthropology and Foucauldian
analysis.
Re-reading Heideggerian Anthropology
Heidegger is the philosopher to whom many humanist anthropologists return,
including Das, if in an oblique way—and of course the thinker on whom Foucaul-
dian concepts also build. As Weiner points out, the discussion of the “they” in
35. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 3–
32.
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Heidegger’s Being and Time is critical for anthropology because it effectively situates
the socialisation that makes us act in the everyday unreﬂectingly (Weiner also reads
this in direct relation to Bourdieu’s habitus).36 Weiner, as a Heideggerian anthropol-
ogist, sets himself the task of showing that the concealment on which this “they”
rests can have positive aspects in non-Western societies, by comparison to the
“deploring” effects it has on “the exercise of human freedom, creativity, and auton-
omy”, as Heidegger, Bourdieu, Marx and Freud maintain in their Western accounts
of the world.37 While Weiner is correct to pick up the point of concealment as pro-
blematic in anthropological terms, I want to argue that to fall back on the Western/
non-Western dichotomy to prove the point undermines its import and recasts the
discipline as the “study of the exotic”. In my reading of this Heideggerian
passage, the problem is with the status accorded to reﬂection as necessarily a sub-
limated activity, not a banal one that might allow the ordinary to descend into the
everyday, as Das would put it, and as Sinan might explain (if perhaps pushed to
elaborate on his act). It is this possibility of reﬂection-as-joust that “habitus” fails
to account for, and which counter-conduct engenders.
Let us consider the Heideggerian everyday more closely. Late on in his treatise,
Heidegger explains “everydayness” (alltäglichkeit) as “the average ways of existing
… that kind of Being in which Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most
part”.38 Problematising this, he continues to say:
“Everydayness”manifestly stands for that way of existing in which Dasein
maintains itself “every day” [“alle Tage”]. And yet this “every day” does
not signify the sum of those “days” which have been allotted to Dasein
in its “lifetime”…what we have primarily in mind in the expression
“everydayness” is a deﬁnite “how” of existence by which Dasein is domi-
nated through and through “for life” [“zeitlebens”]. In our analyses we
have often used the expression “proximally and for the most part”. “Proxi-
mally” signiﬁes the way in which Dasein is “manifest” in the “with-one-
another” of publicness, even if “at bottom” everydayness is precisely
something which, in an existentiell manner, it has “surmounted”. “For
the most part” signiﬁes the way in which Dasein shows itself for Every-
man, not always, but “as a rule”.39
It is important to note the terms of quantity and distance that Heidegger has
throughout the text of Being and Time used in conjunction with the everyday (proxi-
mally and for the most part), which get their deﬁnition here. The ﬁrst relates to a
social/public aspect that infuses the everyday (with-one-another, publicness). The
second relates to the normative/juridical aspect (as a rule). Equally importantly,
the two are linked by a caveat that introduces a vertical dimension to the everyday:
at bottom, everydayness is something to be surmounted. Tellingly, in the following
paragraph, Heidegger will say that “[i]n everydayness Dasein can undergo dull
‘suffering’, sink away in the dullness of it, and evade it by seeking new ways in
which its dispersion in its affairs may be further dispersed. In the moment of
36. James Weiner, Tree Leaf Talk: A Heideggerian Anthropology (Oxford: Berg, 2001), p. 6.
37. Ibid., p. 7.
38. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (London: Blackwell, 1962),
p. 421, ¶71, §370.
39. Ibid., italics in original.
Counter-Conduct and the Everyday 229
vision, indeed, and often just ‘for that moment’, existence can even gain themastery
over the ‘everyday’; but it can never extinguish it”.40 This transcendence has been
shown to exist in a dialogic relationship with the “lostness” of everydayness, and to
refer not to a beyond, but to an appropriation of the shared world.41
What I want to take issue with is the quality of reﬂection that allows this trans-
cendence as philosophical rather than anthropological. Everydayness, in Das’s
anthropological sense, does not have a bottom which reﬂection and philosophy
can surmount. Reﬂection and philosophy must sink into the everyday in order to
grasp it properly. Reﬂection and philosophy, I want to add, happen precisely at
that very bottom within and beyond everydayness. The moment of vision is not
a heroic moment; it can equally well be banal. It does not need to be Revolution,
it can be counter-conduct. It is no coincidence that boredom appears in Heidegger
as such a heroic moment of surmounting—but despite this interpretation of
heroism from his mother who recounts Sinan’s actions to me, he insists on the ban-
ality of it: I was just bored!42
Consider how this slant on the vector of everydayness would shift the normative
and political import of the everyday, putting the “they” under scrutiny. From the
same passage:
To this “how” [of existence in the everyday] there belongs further the com-
fortableness of the accustomed, even if it forces one to do something bur-
densome and “repugnant”… In everydayness everything is all one and the
same, but whatever the day may bring is taken as diversiﬁcation. Every-
dayness is determinative for Dasein even when it has not chosen the
“they” for its “hero”.43
We could argue that the difference between Das’s descent into the everyday and
Heidegger’s sinking into it is both political and anthropological. What Das has in
mind as a movement of “descent” arises from rehabilitating ordinary life after dev-
astation such as mass atrocities, death and poverty. Heidegger, on the other hand,
considers death as an eventuality that Dasein (in its Being-toward-death quality)
spends most of its time shying from, not a past event one must go on living in
spite of. He thus characterises, in another passage, the everyday as a
state-of-mind which consists in an air of superiority with regard to the
certain “fact” of death—a superiority which is “anxiously” concerned
while seemingly free from anxiety. In this state-of-mind, everydayness
acknowledges a “higher” certainty than one which is only empirical.
One knows about the certainty of death, and yet “is” not authentically
certain of one’s own. The falling everydayness of Dasein is acquainted
with death’s certainty, and yet evades Being-certain.44
40. Ibid., §372.
41. Louiza Odysseos, The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations (Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 2007), pp. 112–117.
42. We could of course “thickly” read a concealed heroiﬁcation of the self in precisely this insistence
but I think this would not alter the crucial point, which is the lack of purposeful, conscious and tortured
reﬂection that attends Heideggerian sublimation reached by “philosophy proper”.
43. Heidegger, op. cit., §371.
44. Ibid., §258.
230 Olga Demetriou
The anthropological interjection I read in Das is: what about other deaths, which
are known, and certain, and indeed constitutive of Dasein? In posing this question,
I want to also push it beyond the extreme cases of war, rape and abjection presented
by Das. I want to submit that the concern with any eventual death (as in Heidegger)
is a concern that assumes an ordinary death, a death that is “proximally and for the
most part” average. So the constitution of Dasein, in so far as it pulls up the veil of
contemplating its death, is in essence an “Everyman” constitution. In terms of my
own ethnographic work with the “minority” in western Thrace, it is a “majority”
Dasein. It is a constitution that harks back to a primordial human essence which
is essentially depoliticised. Hence the problem of envisioning a non-heroic
“they”; Jean-Luc Nancy articulates brilliantly this exasperation with Heidegger’s
philosophical anthropology:
[o]ne cannot afﬁrm that the meaning of Being must express itself starting
from everydayness and then begin by neglecting the general differen-
tiation of the everyday, its constantly renewed rupture, its intimate
discord, its polymorphy and its polyphony, its relief and its variety
…“people”, or rather “peoples”, given the irreducible strangeness that
constitutes them as such, are themselves primarily the exposing of the
singularity according to which existence exists, irreducibly and primarily
—and an exposition of singularity that experience claims to communicate
with, in the sense of “to” and “along with”, the totality of beings.45
What I take here from Nancy is, ﬁrst, a re-orientation of philosophical anthropol-
ogy. It should be remembered that right from his methodological introduction, Hei-
degger situates the phenomenology of Dasein against the “personalistic”
movements in the philosophical anthropologies of his time,46 which have been
coloured by the Christian narrative,47 while at the same time he ﬁnds anthropology
valuable as a handmaiden for philosophical work. “To orient the analysis of Dasein
towards the ‘life of primitive peoples’ can have positive signiﬁcance [Bedeutung] as
a method because ‘primitive phenomena’ are often less concealed and less compli-
cated by extensive self-interpretation on the part of Dasein in question”, he says.48
A disciplinary division of labour is thus outlined, where anthropology, as “the
study of primitive peoples”, has little to offer intellectually, but can describe the
link to a primordial human essence that phenomenology strives to discern from
the concealment of a sublime “everyday”. Nancy seems to be suggesting that meth-
odologically we can dispense with this quest for sameness (“existence exists in irre-
ducible strangeness”) and still maintain a phenomenology of experience of
singularity in communication with totality. This seems to expand the scope for
anthropology in philosophy in signiﬁcant ways.
This “irreducible strangeness” that deﬁnes the “general differentiation of the
everyday” might be thought of as inaugurating the political of counter-conduct.
It forces a reﬂection, even if unintentional (recall “mad people and patients”),
through the acknowledgement of strangeness that counter-conduct necessitates.
45. Jean Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 9.
46. Heidegger, op. cit., §47.
47. Ibid., §48.
48. Ibid., ¶11, §51.
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Taking up the case of minority, I want to argue that it can do that by politicising the
(hitherto “social”) “they”.
The Heideggerian “they”, also translatable as “one”, has most commonly been
discussed in societal terms, as positing a tension between conformity (social rules
about what one generally does in certain situations) and conformism (constraining
expectations about what one should do).49 In terms of what I have discussed so far, I
would like to revisit it here not as a concept that impinges on society as distinct from
politics, but one that politicises the social through a politics of otherness and sets the
plane for counter-conduct. An ethnographic reading of the “they” renders it part of
the political precisely because (and not in contrast to the fact that) it points to the
domain of “culture” and (cultural) norms. I say this in recognition of alternative
readings of the “they” as depoliticised, “abscond[ing] from any substantive choice
or commitment”.50 I want to maintain that these are in fact also about a certain poli-
tics of the “they”. Odysseos rightly “points out that the ‘they’ provides notions
about sovereign subjectivity that are deceptive”51 and locates the difﬁculty of the
“they” there. What I suggest is that these notions can be read as part of the Foucaul-
dian ﬁeld of knowledge as power and thus ground the everyday politically.52
Initially, Heidegger concedes a blurry ﬁeld of identiﬁcation and difference: Others,
he says, are “those fromwhom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself—
those among whom one is too”.53 And later on, “[t]he Other can be missing only in
and for Being-with. Being-alone is a deﬁcient mode of Being-with… Being-with
and the facticity of Being with one another are not based on the occurrence together
of several ‘subjects’… those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports
itself… are themselves Dasein. These entities are not objects of concern, but rather
of solicitude”.54 On this basis, it seems unproblematic to then infer that “because
Dasein’s Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being implies the understanding
of Others. This understanding, like any understanding, is not acquaintance
derived from knowledge about them, but a primordially existential kind of Being,
which, more than anything else, makes such knowledge and acquaintance poss-
ible”.55 This claim may seem akin to Nancy’s “singular plural” and it would be
easy to miss the critical, and political, point of “irreducible strangeness” that
Nancy insists on: while Dasein’s irreducibility consists of the possibility of “knowl-
edge and acquaintance”, that of the singular plural consists of strangeness—and
the possibility that it may never be known. The difference is subtle but important.
49. Such interpretations are found in David Egan, “Das Man and Distantiality in Being and Time”,
Inquiry, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2012), pp. 289–306; Edgar Boedeker Jr., “Individual and Community in Early Hei-
degger: Situating dasMan, the Man-Self, and Self-Ownership in Dasein’s Ontological Structure”, Inquiry,
Vol. 44, No. 1 (2001), pp. 63–99; Fred Dallmayr, “Ontology of Freedom: Heidegger and Political Philos-
ophy”, Political Theory, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1984), pp. 204–234; Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commen-
tary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); John Haugeland,
“Heidegger on Being a Person”, Nous, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1982), pp. 15–28.
50. Dallmayr, op. cit, p. 212.
51. Odysseos, The Subject of Co-existence, op. cit., p. 97.
52. What I am therefore also offering is a slightly different discussion to the well-known one on posi-
tive and negative aspects of the “they” (e.g. Dreyfus, op. cit.) as well as to the automatic attachment of the
“they” to Nazi politics (e.g, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to
the Development of a Concept”, Cultural Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2–3 (2007), pp. 240–270, at pp. 250–251).
53. Heidegger, op. cit., ¶ 26, §118, italics in original.
54. Ibid., §121–122 (emphasis original).
55. Ibid., §124.
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Knowledge and strangeness differ politically: they entail different power
relations. For Dasein, these relations take the form of caring about difference in
different ways—“whether that difference is merely one that is to be evened out,
whether one’s own Dasein has lagged behind the Others and wants to catch up
in relationship to them, or whether one’s Dasein already has some priority over
them and sets out to keep them suppressed”.56 These politics of difference,
expressed in the notion of distantiality, are disturbing, Heidegger says—“the
more inconspicuous this kind of Being is to everyday Dasein itself, all the more
stubbornly and primordially does it work itself out”.57 Phenomenology thus ulti-
mately unveils that “Being-with-one-another stands in subjection [Botmässigkeit] to
Others”.58 What is at stake has been a point of argument, where some readings
suggest it is the subjection itself, others that it is the recognition of this subjection.59
What is for me interesting, however, is the moral judgement passed on this politics
of difference that reads, in the speciﬁc passage, almost as an outburst:
Thus the “they”maintains itself factically in the averageness of that which
belongs to it, of that which it regards as valid and that which it does not,
and of that to which it grants success and that to which it denies it. In
this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured,
it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore.
Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything
that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well
known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be
manipulated. Every secret loses its force… By publicness everything gets
obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something
familiar and accessible to everyone… It can be answerable for everything
most easily, because it is not someone who needs to vouch for anything. It
“was” always the “they” who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been
“no one”. In Dasein’s everydayness the agency through which most things
come about is one of which we must say that “it was no one”.60
Such an aspect of the political everyday is indeed compelling. Through the “they”
responsibility is deferred as a matter of course and the self is positioned in such a
way as to be habitually victimised and yet maintain the agency of reﬂection to
recognise that blame is to be apportioned and denounced. In the averageness
that the “they” communicates lies a majoritarian anxiety. Majority, I would
venture to suggest, is ultimately the cause of Dasein’s anxiety.
Ethnographic Reﬂections
Lay discourses on the “they” are abundant and it was without surprise that I
encountered them in ﬁeldwork, both among the minority in Greece and majorities
and minorities in Cyprus. It was found in statements of exasperation at
56. Ibid., §126.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Odysseos, convincingly arguing the latter, provides a review of this debate (The Subject of Co-exist-
ence, op. cit.).
60. Heidegger, op. cit., §127.
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government decisions, in critique of scandals unveiled by the media, in readings of
media reports—readings that reserved judgement on the way events were pre-
sented and what may have actually been at stake (“who knows what is behind
this?”).
For example in Cyprus, where conﬂict resulted in ﬂight and abandoning of prop-
erties, “refugee” has come to signify a particular status of victimisation in Greek-
Cypriot state rhetoric developed since the war of 1974. It is a mode of being
marked by the trauma of abandonment and the resolve not to forget (the lands
and properties abandoned). This structure of feeling interpellates both those who
actually ﬂed and those who did not.61 And yet equally widespread is the insistence
of many individuals that they are refugees “otherwise”—that they may feel loss,
but evaluate it differently to what is expected of them, or even yet feel indifference
to it, or a lack of connection to lands, places and properties. They may consider that
the material aspects of that loss, in the form of property values that can be monet-
arily compensated according to international legal decisions in the last decade, can
be divorced from affective investments. Some of these individuals, expressly
against the advice of their government, have sought compensation from the
Immovable Property Commission set up by Turkey in northern Cyprus. Such
action is described and articulated through an insistence on the right to experience
and act on their refugeeness otherwise—and often justiﬁed on the basis that “they”
have for decades, after all, “deceived us and exploited our pain”. In such cases, the
“they” of the state, government, policy, of “high politics” was the source of true
subjection, and the victimised Self responded by acting differently—opting for a
different way of being governed.
A Heideggerian reading might suggest that the “they” helps to obscure the all-
pervasive structures of power and falsely present the self as sovereign the
moment it passes judgement and acts. A counter-conductive reading, on the
other hand, might not disagree that even the act maintains the system, but evalu-
ates the reﬂection (here in judgement) differently. This is what I am suggesting is
the difference between a politics of knowing and a politics of strangeness. In Hei-
deggerian everydayness, what we should know gets obscured but can be retrieva-
ble in moments of disclosure. In an everydayness that is of “irreducible
strangeness” and “constantly renewed rupture” as Nancy suggests, that reﬂection
is ever-present. Even if Heidegger might not foreclose the latter reading, he is at
best not explicit about its political implications.
I have elsewhere62 analysed this through Rancière’s concept of dissensus,63
whereby disagreement, and not harmonious consensus, comes to characterise the
conduct of politics. It is a characteristic of the political, Rancière insists, and not
some exceptional case where things get out of hand—it makes revolution always
imminent. Dissensus is in this respect another facet of counter-conduct, perhaps
even the “better constructed word” Foucault was looking for. In these terms, the
example of Cypriot refugees is not some “particular” where war and legal
61. I have explored the structures of this “generalised refugeehood” along the lines summarised below
in Olga Demetriou, “’Struck by the Turks’: Reﬂections on Armenian Refugeehood in Cyprus”, Patterns of
Prejudice, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2014), pp. 167–181.
62. Olga Demetriou, “Situating Loss in the Greek–Turkish Encounter in Cyprus”, in Vally Lytra (ed.),
When Greeks and Turks Meet: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Relationship since 1923 (Farnham: Ashgate,
2014), pp. 45–64.
63. Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010).
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intricacies make such dissensus exceptional (even though it is undoubtedly particu-
lar in many respects, including war and legal intricacy). My point is that this loca-
tional particularity does not determine the presence of this form of counter-conduct
(dissensus) per se. The “they” that founds it is a general one. As an ethnographic
example, it does not serve to show exceptionalism, but generality.
In the examples I offered, the anthropological everyday allows us to particularise
counter-conduct as constituting minority subjectivities in speciﬁc ways. For some-
body to be able to mock one’s neighbours, as Sinan does, while also mocking the
instrument of such mockery (an anthem) a double ﬁlter of reﬂection on the self,
the community and the political is required, that is mostly absent from majority
communities. This mode of subjectivity shows a “they” that drives everydayness
that is more exposed than Heidegger seems ready to concede. It is a “they” that
one unequivocally belongs to and profoundly understands, and yet in a different
way to the “possibility of knowledge” Heidegger induces from the self–other
equation. It is not primordial, as Heidegger suggests, because it is non-existent
for the majority. It is cultural.
There are no secrets to the communal backwardness Sinan attacks in singing at
the elderly women, even though the self’s radicality may be obscure to that commu-
nal “they”. A power dynamic is undoubtedly present, and it may at points con-
strain. But the difference between this self-integral “they” and the “they” of a
higher order (the government) that even though familiar always subjects and
stands in an antagonistic relationship to the self is qualitatively different. “Min-
ority”works on both of these “they”s at once. This doubling is what fundamentally
orders knowledge and strangeness. “Being refugee for you”, I was told by an
Armenian in Cyprus displaced through the conﬂict but prior to 1974, “is ‘a different
thing’”—the phrase “different thing” referred to a remark made to her by a Greek-
Cypriot refugee who claimed that her loss in 1974 somehow counted differently
and was more profound than Armenian displacements 10 years earlier. The
“you” referred to the Greek-Cypriot “majority” and indexed the knowledge that
I, as a majority member, did not have, and that this minority woman lived her
everyday by. This doubling, then, makes “minority” a particular example of “com-
munity” as understood by Nancy through reﬂection when he deﬁnes the latter as
“the resistance and insistence of community”.64 This reﬂection is what wemay pin-
point as the speciﬁcity of minority counter-conduct.
In another instance, a Cypriot Maronite tells documentary ﬁlm-makers that
when he was young he felt a double shame for the language he and his family
and friends spoke: “we felt ashamed to hear other Maronites talk in Arabic to
each other, and we felt even more ashamed for feeling ashamed… so we were
ashamed of being ashamed of being who we are”.65 This double shame eloquently
marks the speciﬁcity of minority counter-conduct that I have been talking about.
And it also shows why minority counter-conduct can offer a vantage point from
which to understand counter-conduct more generally. In this double shame,
conduct and counter-conduct are enmeshed and shown to constitute each other.
Conduct is instantiated by the internalisation of subjection in being ashamed to
speak a language and being ashamed to be different. But counter-conduct
64. Jean Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991),
p. 42.
65. Costas Constantinou and Giorgos Skordis, The Third Motherland (documentary; Cyprus: Constan-
tinou and Skordis, 2011); quote appears at 15:48.
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emerges at the same moment as this internalisation, in the reﬂection that is necess-
ary for realising that this subjection is at operation and that this subjection should
be otherwise—the shame of being ashamed.
Perhaps the political of counter-conduct can be thought of as inhering in this
“should”: whereas Foucault deﬁnes counter-conduct as the imagination of what
“could” be otherwise, minority counter-conduct reminds us that this is not all,
there is an additional move to be made from the “could” to the “should” for
counter-conduct to be re-situated as a political concept. The victimisation permeat-
ing this example is more obvious than in the examples I have offered so far and
perhaps exempliﬁes more directly Das’s “descent” into everydayness. But the
lack of sublimation that marks this descent allows us to see the links with those
less extreme examples: there is reﬂection here as well that enables counter-
conduct to emerge, but this reﬂection is not the reﬂection of philosophical disclos-
ure. It is an immediate “reﬂex” knowledge arising at the moment subjection is
encountered and expressed more as feeling than thought. And yet it is part and
parcel of the particular condition, in this case minority, not a primordial knowledge
that Being is born with irrespective of multiplicity.
Counter-conduct is therefore a methodological pointer to this everyday, which is
thoroughly politicised but in each context politicised differently. This methodologi-
cal instruction is the signiﬁcance of counter-conduct in its broad, political, but not
politically charged (or politically determined) sense. It is what marks subjectivity as
an always potentially dissensual mode of being. And yet it is not primordial, it does
not precede conduct and its different forms. It arises with it and is thus differen-
tiated. It is in this sense that counter-conduct, via consideration of the everyday,
in each case, and in an anthropological sense, can enrich the critique of state
power as it comes to structure that everyday—whether by conducting minority
populations, failing to redress the rubble left behind by violence, or streamlining
refugeehood.
Conclusion
In this article, I have approached counter-conduct as a conceptual operation, using
anthropological insights to argue that counter-conduct is reﬂection on everyday
practice. My methodological claim is that an anthropological perspective on
counter-conduct offers possibilities for reconsidering some of the ideas that politi-
cal philosophy consistently returns to—the notions of the everyday and otherness.
Although the conceptualisation of “counter-conduct” offers signiﬁcant liberating
possibilities for rethinking big “political” questions such as agency, resistance
and revolution, it hinges on a deeply nuanced understanding of the everyday
that anthropology is well positioned to elucidate, but which has yet to be properly
grasped outside the discipline. The stake in this claim is for a repositioning of the
two disciplines on a more equal footing in the theorisation of “the everyday” as a
political category and the plane of counter-conduct. Bringing insights from anthro-
pological thought and ethnographic examples to bear on philosophical accounts of
the “everyday” I hope to have shown that more engagement between the two dis-
ciplines could also imply more engagement with the political. The general, as the
subject of philosophy, and the speciﬁc, as that of anthropology, are not ultimately
about humanity vs. culture but about calibrations of power. It is these calibrations
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that we constantly need to keep in mind in the ways we nuance the everyday,
counter-conduct and, ultimately, the political. Counter-conduct is essential to
inhabiting everydayness in general and especially for minority subjectivity. The
implications of this for understanding minority subjectivities are tremendous,
and they are also instructive about the political conditions of reﬂection everywhere.
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